House is Gone but Debt Lives On; Expect Huge Surge in Deficiency Lawsuits, by Mike “Mish” Shedlock


Forty-one states allow lenders to sue for mortgage debt if a home fetches less than the mortgage in a foreclosure sale. It always will. Such lawsuits are one of the reasons I have consistently advised people to consult an attorney before walking away.

For a nice write-up on deficiency judgments please consider the Wall Street Journal article House Is Gone but Debt Lives On.

Joseph Reilly lost his vacation home here last year when he was out of work and stopped paying his mortgage. The bank took the house and sold it. Mr. Reilly thought that was the end of it.

In June, he learned otherwise. A phone call informed him of a court judgment against him for $192,576.71. It turned out that at a foreclosure sale, his former house fetched less than a quarter of what Mr. Reilly owed on it. His bank sued him for the rest.

The result was a foreclosure hangover that homeowners rarely anticipate but increasingly face: a “deficiency judgment.”

Until recently, “there was a false sense of calm” among borrowers who went through foreclosure, Mr. Englett says. “That’s changing,” he adds, as borrowers learn they may be financially on the hook even after the house is gone.

Some close observers of the housing scene are convinced this is just the beginning of a surge in deficiency judgments. Sharon Bock, clerk and comptroller of Palm Beach County, Fla., expects “a massive wave of these cases as banks start selling the judgments to debt collectors.”

Because most targets have scant savings, the judgments sell for only about two cents on the dollar, versus seven cents for credit-card debt, according to debt-industry brokers.

Silverleaf Advisors LLC, a Miami private-equity firm, is one investor in battered mortgage debt. Instead of buying ready-made deficiency judgments, it buys banks’ soured mortgages and goes to court itself to get judgments for debt that remains after foreclosure sales.

Silverleaf says its collection efforts are limited. “We are waiting for the economy to somewhat heal so that it’s a better time to go after people,” says Douglas Hannah, managing director of Silverleaf.

Investors know that most states allow up to 20 years to try to collect the debts, ample time for the borrowers to get back on their feet. Meanwhile, the debts grow at about an 8% interest rate, depending on the state.

Laws vary from state to state and things may depend on whether or not the loan is a recourse loan or not. Once again, before walking away, and before considering a short-sale or bankruptcy, please consult an attorney who knows real estate laws for your state.

Mike “Mish” Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com

Robo-Signing Woman Kept Signing Docs- 13 Years After Her Death, by Housingdoom.com


Who says that just because you’re dead you can’t keep on working? In what is certainly the most blatant case of robo-signing I’ve seen to date, one company had a woman signing hundreds of documents- for thirteen years after her death. [Hat tip Freedoms Phoenix.]

How, may you ask, can a woman who has been dead since 1995 sign documents more than a decade later? Normally, one would hazard to guess that stamps with her signature on them were still in use (this is more common than you would think in foreclosure land). That would be plenty troubling.

But this little account comes from the debt collection realm, a cesspool of bad practices. Here, the credit card company Providian (acquired by WaMu in 2005) had employees signing affidavits in the name of Martha Kunkle for over a decade. Debt collection agencies continued to use these bogus affidavits.
According to the Wall St. Journal:
Questions about Martha Kunkle first popped up in 2008 after her name appeared in thousands of affidavits generated by a unit of Providian National Corp. The credit-card issuer sold an undisclosed number of delinquent account balances to Portfolio Recovery Associates and other debt collectors, which then sued the borrowers to collect the debt…..

Concerns about Ms. Kunkle’s affidavits were raised in 2008 by lawyers for Jeanie Cole, one of thousands of Montana residents sued by Portfolio Recovery Associates to collect debts. After failing to locate Ms. Kunkle, lawyers for Ms. Cole interviewed her daughter, who worked at Providian in a document-processing division.

The daughter testified in a deposition that other Providian employees used the name Martha Kunkle when signing affidavits. Along with other employees, the daughter was responsible for signing affidavits. After countersuing Portfolio Recovery Associates for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Ms. Cole was the lead plaintiff in a 2008 federal-court suit in Montana alleging the company targeted 16,000 borrowers using “false and misleading” affidavits.
These dodgy documents were for debt collections, not foreclosures. However, this does show how sloppy and overly automated the lending industry has become.
Some judges say robo-signing, in which affidavits are signed without fully reviewing underlying documentation, is more common in debt-collection cases than foreclosures. In July, the Federal Trade Commission recommended that state regulators require the disclosure of “more information” by debt collectors and buyers, concluding that they might be relying on erroneous or incomplete paperwork when suing to recover money.

“I’ve watched and wanted to tell defendants in these suits to demand proof of the underlying debt because that proof is so often flimsy,” said Jeffrey Lipman, a magistrate judge in Polk County, Iowa, which includes Des Moines, the state’s capital. Court rules give him little leeway to instruct borrowers in court.
Borrowers, beware.

Jumbo Mortgages Easier to Come By, Thetruthaboutmortgage.com


Jumbo mortgages, which seemed to go the way of the buffalo once the mortgage crisis set in, are starting to make a comeback, per data parsed by the Wall Street Journal.
The publication said jumbo mortgage lenders originated $18 billion during the second quarter, up roughly 20 percent from the second quarter, using data from Inside Mortgage Finance.
That might explain all those recent OneWest Bank (formerly Indymac) billboards touting “jumbo loans without the mumbo jumbo.”
Chase Home Lending increased its jumbo loan lending by 146.2 percent in the first half of 2010, compared to last year.
Wells Fargo increased its jumbo fundings by 47.5 percent, and PHH Corp. saw jumbo loan origination volume soar 64.6 percent during the same period.
Of course, jumbo lending remains far below levels seen pre-boom and even early-crisis.
Jumbo mortgages accounted for just five percent of total mortgage originations in 2009 and so far in 2010, down from about 20 percent during 2004-2007.
Historically, jumbo loans capture about 18 percent of the market, according to Inside Mortgage Finance CEO Guy Cecala.
Jumbo loans are those that exceed the conforming loan limit, which is currently set at $417,000, though it’s temporarily as high as $729,750, thanks to fairly recent legislation changes that created so-called jumbo-conforming mortgages.
If you’re in the market for a jumbo loan, understand that underwriting guideline are still very tight, meaning full documentation is typically required, along with a hefty down payment.

Signs Hyperinflation Is Arriving, by Gonzalo Lira


This post is gonna be short and sweet—and scary:

Back in late August, I argued that hyperinflation would be triggered by a run on Treasury bonds. I described how such a run might happen, and argued that if Treasuries were no longer considered safe, then commodities would become the store of value.

 

Such a run on commodities, I further argued, would inevitably lead to price increases and a rise in the Consumer Price Index, which would initially be interpreted by the Federal Reserve, the Federal government, as well as the commentariat, as a good thing: A sign that “the economy is recovering”, a sign that “normalcy” was returning.
I argued that—far from being “a sign of recovery”—rising CPI would be the sign that things were about to get ugly.
I concluded that, like the stagflation of ‘79, inflation would rise to the double digits relatively quickly. However, unlike in 1980, when Paul Volcker raised interest rates severely in order to halt inflation, in today’s weakened macro-economic environment, that remedy is simply not available to Ben Bernanke.

Therefore, I predicted that inflation would spiral out of control, and turn into hyperinflation of the U.S. dollar.

A lot of people claimed I was on drugs when I wrote this.

Now? Not so much.

In my initial argument, I was sure that there would come a moment when Treasury bond holders would realize that they are the New & Improved Toxic Asset—as everyone knows, there is no way the U.S. Federal government can pay the outstanding debt it has: It’s simply too big.

So I assumed that, when the market collectively realized this, there would be a panic in Treasuries. This panic, of course, would lead to the spike in commodities.

However, I am no longer certain if there will ever be such a panic in Treasuries. Backstop Benny has been so adroit at propping up Treasuries and keeping their yields low, the Stealth Monetization has been so effective, the TBTF banks’ arbitrage trade between the Fed’s liquidity windows and Treasury bond yields has been so lucrative, and the bond market itself is so aware that Bernanke will do anything to protect and backstop Treasuries, that I no longer think that there will necessarily be such a panic.
But that doesn’t mean that the second part of my thesis—commodities rising, which will trigger inflation, which will devolve into hyperinflation—will not occur.
In fact, it is occurring.

The two key commodities that have been rising as of late are oil and grains, specifically wheat, corn and livestock feed. The BLS report on Producer Price Index of commodities is here.

Grains as a class have risen over 33% year-over-year. Refined oil products have risen just shy of 13%, with home heating oil rising 18% year-over-year. In other words: Food, gasoline and heating oil have risen by double digits since 2009. And the 2010-‘11 winter in the northern hemisphere is approaching.

A friend of mine, SB, a commodities trader, pointed out to me that big producers are hedged against rising commodities prices. As he put it to me in a private e-mail, “We sometimes forget that the commodity markets aren’tsolely speculative. Most futures contracts are bought by companies whouse those commodities in their products, and are thus hedging their costs to produce those products.”

Very true: But SB also pointed out that, hedged or not, the lag time between agricultural commodities and the markets is about six-to-nine months, on average. So he thought that the rise in grains, which really took off in June–July, would hit the supermarket shelves in January–March.

He also pointed out that, with higher commodity costs and lower consumption, companies are going to be between the Devil and the deep blue sea. My own take is, if you can’t get more customers, then you’re just gonna have to charge more from the ones you got.

Coupled to these price increases is the ongoing Currency War: The U.S.—contrary to Secretary Timothy Geithner’s statements—is trying to debase the dollar, so as to make U.S. exports more attractive to foreign consumers. This has created strains with China, Europe and the emerging markets.

A beggar-thy-neighbor monetary policy works for small countries getting out of a hole of their own making: It doesn’t work for the world’s largest single economy with the world’s reserve currency, in the middle of a Global Depression.

On the contrary, it creates a backlash; the ongoing tiff over rare-earth minerals with China is just the beginning. This could easily be exacerbated by clumsy politicking, and turn into a full-on trade war.

What’s so bad with a trade war, you ask? Why nothing, not a thing—if you want to pay through the nose for imported goods. If you enjoy paying 10, 20, 30% more for imported goods—then hey, let’s just stick it to them China-men! They’re still Commies, after all!

Furthermore, as regards the Federal Reserve policy, the upcoming Quantitative Easing 2, and the actions of its chairman, Ben Bernanke: There is an increasing sense in the financial markets that Backstop Benny and his Lollipop Gang don’t have the foggiest clue about what they’re doing.

Consider:

Bruce Krasting just yesterday wrote a very on-the-money précis of the trial balloons the Fed is floating, as regards to QE2: Basically, Bernanke through his WSJ mouthpiece said that the Fed was going to go for a cautious, incrementalist approach, vis-à-vis QE2: “A couple of hundred billion at a time”. You know: “Just the tip—just to see how it feels.”

But then on the other hand, also just yesterday, Tyler Durden at Zero Hedge had a justifiable freak-out over the NY Fed asking Primary Dealers for their thoughts on the size of QE2. According to Bloomberg, the NY Fed was asking the dealers how big they thought QE2 would be, and how big they thought itought be: $250 billion? $500 billion? A trillion? A trillion every six months? (Or as Tyler pointed out, $2 trillion for 2011.)

That’s like asking a bunch of junkies how much smack they want for the upcoming year—half a kilo? A full kilo? Two kilos?

What the hell you think the junkies are gonna say?

Between BK’s clear reading of the tea leaves coming from the Wall Street Journal, and TD’s also very clear reading of the tea leaves by way of Bloomberg, you’re getting a seriously contradictory message: The Fed is going to lightly tap-tap-tap liquidity into the markets—just a little—just a few hundred billion dollars at a time—

—while at the same time, the Fed is saying to the Primary Dealers, “We’re gonna make you guys happy-happy-happy with a righteously sized QE2!”

The contradictory messages don’t pacify the financial markets—on the contrary, they make the markets simultaneously contemptuous of Bernanke and the Fed, while very frightened as to what they will ultimately do.

What happens when the financial markets don’t really know what the central bank is going to do, and suspect that the central bankers themselves aren’t too clear either?

Guess.

So to sum up, we have:

• Rising commodity prices, the effects of which (because of hedging) will be felt most severely in the period January–March of 2011.

• A beggar-thy-neighbor race-to-the-bottom Currency War, that might well devolve into a Trade War, which would force up prices on imported goods.

• A Federal Reserve that does not seem to know what it is doing, as regards another round of Quantitative Easing, which is making the financial markets very nervous—nervous about the Fed’s ultimate responsibility, which is safeguarding the U.S. dollar.

• A U.S. economy that is weak to the point of collapse, where not even 0.25% interest rates are sparking investment and growth—and which therefore prohibits the Fed from raising interest rates, if need be.

• A U.S. fiscal deficit which is close to 10% of GDP annually, and which is therefore unsustainable—especially considering that the total U.S. fiscal debt is well over 100% of GDP.

These factors all point to one and the same thing:

An imminent currency collapse.

Therefore, I am confident in predicting the following sequence of events:

• By March of 2011, once higher commodity prices reach the marketplace, monthly CPI will be at an annualized rate of not less than 5%.

• By July of 2011, annualized CPI will be no less than 8% annualized.

• By October of 2011, annualized CPI will have crossed 10%.

• By March of 2012, annualized CPI will cross the hyperinflationary tipping point of 15%.

After that, CPI will rapidly increase, much like it did in 1980.

What the mainstream commentariat will make of all this will be really something: When CPI reaches 5% by the winter of 2011, pundits and economists and the Fed and the Obama administration will all say the same thing: “Happy days are here again! People are spending! The economy is back on track!”

However, by the late spring, early summer of 2011, people will realize what’s going on—and the Federal Reserve will initially be unwilling to drastically raise interest rates so as to quell inflation.

Actually, the Fed won’t be able to raise rates, at least not like Volcker did back in 1980: The U.S. economy will be too weak, and the Federal government’s balance sheet will be too distressed, with it’s $1.5 trillion deficit. So at first, the Fed will have to let the rising inflation rate slide, and keep trying hard to explain it away as “a sign of a recovering economy”.

Once the Fed realizes that the rising CPI is not a sign of a reignited economy, but rather a sign of the collapsing dollar, they will pursue a puerile “inflation fighting” scheme of incremental interest rate hikes—much like G. William Miller, the Chairman of the Fed from January of ‘78 to August of ‘79, pursued so unsuccessfully.

2012 will be the bad year: I predict that hyperinflation’s tipping point will be no later than the first quarter of 2012. From there, it will accelerate. By the end of 2012, I would not be surprised if the CPI for the year averaged 30%.

By that point, the rest of the economy—unemployment, GDP, all the rest of it—will be in the toilet. By that point, the rest of the economy will no longer matter: The collapsing dollar will make 2012 the really really bad year of our Global Depression—which is actually kind of funny.

It’s funny because, as you know, I am a conservative Catholic: I of course put absolutely no stock in the ridiculous notion that “The Mayans predicted our civilization’s collapse in 2012!”—that’s all rubbish, as far as I’m concerned.

It’s just one of those cosmic jokes that 2012 will turn out to be the year the dollar collapses, and the larger world economies go down the tubes.

As cosmic jokes go, all I’ve got to say is this:

Good one, God.

Gonzalo Lira’s  Blog
http://gonzalolira.blogspot.com

 

The Foreclosure Mess MBS Hate Triangle Emerges: Junior Versus Senior Bondholders Versus Servicers, by Tyler Durden, Zerohedge.com


The WSJ has an article that does a great job of qualifying the impact of what the foreclosure halt will do to the traditional cash waterfall priority schedule inherent in every MBS deal. To wit: junior bondholders will rejoice as they will receive payments for the duration of the halt/moratorium (these would and should cease upon an act of foreclosure), while senior bondholders will suffer, as the deficiency money will come out of the total “reserve” in the pooling and servicing agreement set up by the servicers. As for the servicers themselves, they should be “reimbursed by funds in the trust for all costs related to litigation and extra processing of foreclosures, provided they follow standard industry practices.” In other words, it will now become “every man, sorry, banker for themselves” as each party attempts to preserve as much capital as possible given the new development: juniors will push for an indefinite foreclosure halt, seniors will seek an immediate resumption of the status quo, while the servicers stand to get stuck with billion dollar legal and deficiency fees if it is found that “standard industry practices” were not followed. Alas, it would appears that the servicers have by far the weakest case, and the impact to the banks, whose sloppy standards brought this whole situation on, will be in the tens if not billions of dollars. Oh, and suddenly both junior and senior classes will be embroiled in very vicious, painful, and extended litigation with the servicers. Lots of litigation.

More from the WSJ on the conflict between juniors and seniors:

When houses that have been packaged into a mortgage bond are liquidated at a foreclosure sale—the very end of the foreclosure process—the holders of the junior, or riskiest debt, would be the first investors to take losses. But if a foreclosure is delayed, the servicer must typically keep advancing payments that will go to all bondholders, including the junior debt holders, even though the home loan itself is producing no revenue stream.

The latest events thus set up an odd circumstance where junior bondholders—typically at the bottom of the credit structure—could actually end up better off than they expected. Senior bondholders, typically at the top, could end up worse off.

Not surprisingly, senior debt holders want banks to foreclose faster to reduce expenses. Junior bondholders are generally happy to stretch things out. What is more, it isn’t entirely clear how the costs of re-processing tens of thousands of mortgages will be allocated. Those costs could be “significant” said Andrew Sandler, a Washington, D.C., attorney who represents mortgage companies.

“This is sort of an extraordinary situation,” said Debashish Chatterjee, a vice president for Moody’s Investors Service who covers structured finance. By delaying foreclosures, “it means the subordinate bondholders don’t get written down for a much longer period of time, and they keep getting payments.”

This, however, ignores the class that will impacted the most by all this: servicers.

Typically, mortgage servicers enter into contracts called pooling and servicing agreements with bondholders that spell out the servicers’ obligations to manage the loans in the best interests of the investors. These agreements provide that the servicers be reimbursed by funds in the trust for all costs related to litigation and extra processing of foreclosures, provided they follow standard industry practices.

Servicing companies hope the reviews will be quick. At GMAC Mortgage, a unit of Ally Financial Inc., the vast majority of these affidavits will be resolved in the coming weeks and before the end of the year,” a spokeswoman for the company said. A spokesman for J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. said the company’s review process is expected to take “a few weeks.”

But the problems could be magnified if the reviews uncover a lack of proper documentation or other substantive problems rather than simple procedural errors. The furor over servicer practices is also likely to trigger additional legal challenges from borrowers facing foreclosure and more judicial scrutiny, which could further slow the process and increase foreclosure costs.

And the explanation for why one day soon the XLF will open limit down, as soon as Wall Street sellside research gets their cranium out of their gluteus:

“It’s very hard to see how the servicers can avoid reimbursing the trusts for losses caused by taking short cuts,” said David J. Grais, an attorney in New York who represents investors. Investors could press trustees to investigate servicer conduct, sue the servicers to recoup damages or replace a servicer, he said.

As we said: lots of litigation… playa.

And since Wall Street continues to refuse to touch this topic with a ten foot pole (here is the bottom line for those who may not have been paying attention: huge hits to bank EPS) Zero Hedge is in the process of quantifying just how many billions of dollars each day, week and month of halted foreclosures will bring to the juniors, and how many more billions servicers will be on the hook for unless they manage to convince each of the hundreds of judges in thousands of upcoming lawsuits that all the mortgage fraud (for lack of a better word) was “standard industry practice.”